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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Edward Allen Walker, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals convictions for possession of a clandestine lab or supplies, 
a first degree felony, and possession of controlled substance, a third degree felony. 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 
2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Issue: Did the State violate defendant's right to a speedy trial when it tried 
defendant on two felonies less than five months after filing charges? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's ruling on a speedy trial 
motion for correctness. Salt Lake City v. Roseto, 2002 UT App 66, f 7,44 P.3d 835. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
United States Constitution, Sixth Amendment: "In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public tr ial . . ." 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-1-6 (West 2004): A defendant is entitled "to a trial 
within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if the business of court 
permits." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 17, 2004, officers observed defendant leaving a meth lab in 
West Valley City. R. 5. Officers arrested defendant that day on outstanding 
warrants, R. 2,203:22, and then arrested defendant on these charges on January 26, 
2005. R. 7. On January 26, 2005, the State also filed an Information charging 
defendant with one count of possessing a clandestine lab or supplies, a first degree 
felony, and one count of possessing methamphetamine, a third degree felony. R. 1-
3. 
On March 17,2005, the trial court held a preliminary hearing, R. 24-25; 224:1-
23. During that hearing, a detective mentioned that he had recorded the initial 
interview with defendant. R. 224:14. Defense counsel objected, claiming that he 
had not yet received a copy of that recording. R. 224:14-15. The court accordingly 
continued the preliminary hearing. R. 24-25. The preliminary hearing concluded on 
2 
April 7,2005; at the close of evidence, the court bound defendant over for trial. R. 
43-44; 226:13. 
On April 19,2005, the court held a hearing at which defendant invoked his 
right to be tried within 30 days of arraignment. R. 228:2.l The court scheduled a 
two-day jury trial for May 16-17,2005. R. 51-52; R. 228:2. 
On May 13, 2005, however, the court made a docket entry stating that the 
"State prosecutor, James Cope, is in California for emergency, trial continued as per 
phone conference with Nathan Jardine and Patricia Cassell in Judge Kennedy's 
chambers." Addendum A.2 As a result, defendant's trial was continued to June 6-7, 
2005. R. 86-89,144-45. 
On June 3, 2005, defendant filed a motion to dismiss. R. 79-83. Defendant 
argued that the State had violated his statutory right to have a trial within 30 days of 
arraignment. R. 79-83. The parties argued this motion on the morning of trial. R. 
229: 8-12. During argument, defense counsel noted that while the court had 
1
 The record does not contain a minute entry indicating when the arraignment 
actually occurred. Prior to trial, the prosecutor suggested that the arraignment 
likely occurred following the April 7, 2005, bindover. R. 229: 10. In his brief, 
defendant notes that this would have been consistent with rule 10(a), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Aplt. Br. 10. For purposes of this appeal, the State does not 
dispute this suggestion. 
Nathan Jardine was defendant's trial counsel. R. 229-30. Patricia Cassell is 
an attorney in the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office. 
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originally scheduled a trial for May 16-17, 2005, the "prosecution could not go 
forward on that date." R. 229:8. The prosecutor confirmed this, explaining that he 
"was unable to proceed on that day." R. 229:10. 
The court denied defendant's motion. The court explained that the 
continuance was necessary because the prosecutor had "an emergency situation at 
the last minute with the illness of his mother in a different state, necessitating his 
travel." R. 229:12. The court concluded that this was a "legitimate" reason for 
pushing the trial back because it "would have been impossible for the State to have 
a new prosecutor assigned" on such short notice. R. 229:12-13. 
Following presentation of the evidence, the jury convicted defendant on both 
counts. R. 145. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
In late 2004, officers from a narcotics task force received a tip that defendant 
was operating a meth lab out of an apartment in Murray. R. 229: 114,125. On 
November 17,2004, officers began conducting surveillance on that apartment. R. 
229:113. 
3
 "In setting out the facts from the record on a p p e a l . . . all conflicts and 
doubts" are resolved "in favor of the jury's verdict and the rulings of the trial 
court." State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50,11 n.l, 42 P.3d 1248 (quotations and citation 
omitted). 
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Shortly after officers got into position, two detectives observed defendant exit 
the apartment with a female companion. R. 229: 115-17. Defendant and his 
companion were gone for 10 minutes and then returned to the apartment. R. 229: 
117. Three hours later, defendant and his companion emerged again. R. 229:120-21. 
The female was carrying a thermos and some small bags. R. 229: 95. Defendant 
opened the hood of a car, and then took the thermos and bags and began securing 
them in the engine compartment. R. 229: 95; 203. One of the detectives later 
testified that drug dealers commonly hide contraband in the engine compartment of 
cars. R. 229: 209. 
The detectives approached defendant and arrested him. R. 229:98.4 Officers 
found a syringe in defendant's pocket. R. 229:204. The officers pulled the bags and 
thermos out from under the hood of the car. R. 229:204. Inside, they found iodine 
crystals, tubing, and methamphetamine. R. 229:204. 
Defendant's companion consented to a search of the apartment. There was a 
"thick" "chemical smell" in the apartment, and the back bedrooms were filled with 
a "hazy smoke." R. 229:123. Officers were concerned about the presence of "toxic 
chemicals," so they exited the apartment and donned respirators. R. 229:124. After 
4
 Defendant has not challenged the legality of the arrest. 
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resuming the search, they found meth lab components "scattered throughout the 
apartment" R. 229:147. Specifically, officers found glass jars and cylinders (229: 
124), iodine in a glass jar (R. 229:185),5 clear liquids and tubing (229:188), a one-
gallon jug of muriatic acid (229:189), a container with a "dark, blue-colored crystal" 
(229: 127), and a coffee pot with "red sludge in the bottom of it" (R. 229: 187). 
Officers also found sodium hydroxide, pseudoephedrine, hydrochloric acid, and 
phosphorous, all of which are used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. R. 
229:174-77. Finally, officers found completed methamphetamine. R. 229:174-77. 
One of the detectives gave defendant his Miranda warnings and then 
interviewed himi. R. 229:132. At the beginning of the interview, defendant told the 
detective: "If you guys been watching the place for awhile, you probably know 
what's really been going on here." Exhibit A at 30:40-30:47.6 Defendant admitted 
that he "knew what was going on" at the apartment, but claimed that while he had 
smoked methamphetamine at the apartment and had helped clean the apartment, 
he had not helped manufacture methamphetamine. Exhibit A at 37:15-30. After 
further questioning, however, defendant admitted that he had had some 
5
 Iodine acts as a "reagent" in the manufacturing of methamphetamine. R. 
229:172. 
6
 Exhibit A is a recording of the interview that defendant introduced at trial. 
This exhibit is contained in a non-paginated manila folder in the record. 
6 
involvement with the lab: "I'm not telling you f-ing that I f-ing didn't have any 
involvement in it." Exhibit A at 40: 30-40. Defendant also admitted that he had 
helped dismantle the lab. Exhibit A at 40:50-55. As questioning progressed further, 
defendant also admitted that he had given the occupants "a few pointers" on how to 
properly make methamphetamine. Exhibit A at 45:00-47:30. 
At trial, defendant again admitted that he had given tips on how to make 
methamphetamine to the operators of the lab, that he had helped them dismantle 
the methamphetamine lab, and that he had been smoking methamphetamine prior 
to being arrested. R. 230:38-39,42. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that he is entitled to relief because the State failed to try him 
within 30 days of his arraignment. Defendant waived this claim, however, by 
repeatedly agreeing to a trial date that was beyond the 30-day limit. This Court 
therefore should not address this claim. 
In any event, the 30-day rule set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 77-1-6 (West 
2004) is not mandatory. Instead, a violation of § 77-1-6 simply triggers review 
under the four-factor constitutional test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 
(1972). Under Barker, the court considers: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons 
7 
for the delay, (3) defendant's assertion of the right, and (4) the prejudice suffered by 
defendant. 
Applied to this case, these factors do not warrant reversal. First, the length of 
delay was minimal, particularly given the complexities of this prosecution. Second, 
while the State did request a continuance of the originally scheduled trial, it only 
did so because of the prosecutor's unavoidable family emergency. This was not 
oppressive or persecutorial in nature. Third, defendant never invoked his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial, and he twice agreed to a trial date that was 
more than 30 days from his arraignment. Fourth, defendant has not demonstrated 
that he was prejudiced by the delay in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED A SPEEDY TRIAL 
VIOLATION WHERE HE WAS TRIED LESS THAN FIVE 
MONTHS AFTER BEING CHARGED 
A. Defendant waived this claim by affirmatively agreeing to a trial 
date that was beyond the 30-day limit. 
Defendant claims that he is entitled to relief under Utah Code Annotated 
§ 77-1-6 (West 2004) because he was not tried within 30 days of arraignment. Aplt. 
Br. 10-21. Under the invited error doctrine, however, a party cannot "set[ ] up an 
error at trial and then complain[ ] of it on appeal/' State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 
8 
1205 (Utah App, 1991) (quotations and citation omitted). "[UJnder the doctrine of 
invited error, we have declined to engage in even plain error review when counsel, 
either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the [trial] court that he or she 
had no objection to the [action taken]/' State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4,114,128 P.3d 
1171 (second alteration in original) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also 
State v. Redding, 2007 UT App 350, f 25,172 P.3d 319. 
In this case, defendant expressly agreed to a trial date that was more than 30 
days after his arraignment. Specifically, on April 19,2005, the trial court scheduled 
a two-day trial that would begin on May 16,2005. R. 228:2. Although this would 
have been 39 days after defendant's April 7 arraignment, defendant expressly 
agreed to that trial date. R. 228:2. When the issue was subsequently raised during 
arguments on defendant's motion to dismiss, defendant affirmatively stated that he 
would not "have had an objection" had the trial occurred on May 16. R. 229:12. 
Thus, although defendant now claims that the court violated his rights under 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-1-6, defendant expressly agreed to a trial date that 
violated this very statute, and he later reaffirmed that he would not have objected to 
that initial date. Insofar as defendant expressly agreed that the court could violate 
the statute that is now at issue, this Court should not review this claim. 
9 
B. If addressed on its merits, defendant's claim should be analyzed 
under the test set forth in Barker v. Wingo. 
Under § 77-l-6(l)(h), a defendant is entitled "to a trial within 30 days after 
arraignment if unable to post bail and if the business of court permits." Utah courts 
have repeatedly held that the 30-day rule set forth in § 77-l-6(l)(h) is "directory in 
nature, not mandatory." State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204,207 (Utah App. 1991); accord 
State v. Trafny, 799 R2d 704,708 (Utah 1990); State v. Menzies, 601 P.2d 925,926 (Utah 
1979). When the 30-day rule is violated, the result is not dismissal; rather, the 
statutory violation acts as a "triggering mechanism" for a review of the case under 
the test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). Hoyt, 806 P.2d at 207.7 
In Barker, the Supreme Court identified four factors that should be considered 
when a defendant claims that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was 
violated: the "[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of 
his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. But courts are not 
always required to examine all four factors. Instead, the first factor, the length of the 
delay, acts as a "triggering mechanism" for the remaining factors. Id. If the 
7
 In Hoyt, this Court explained that § 77-l-6(l)(h) is "designed to implement 
the 'speedy trial' guaranty of the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution." State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204,207 n.2 (Utah App. 1991). A violation of 
§ 77-l-6(l)(h) is therefore analyzed "with reference primarily to Sixth Amendment 
cases." Id. 
10 
delay is long enough to be considered "presumptively prejudicial/' courts examine 
all four factors; if the delay is not long length to be considered presumptively 
prejudicial, however, the length of delay is considered dispositive and courts do not 
examine the remaining factors. Id. When analyzed under the constitutional 
standard, delays are typically considered to be presumptively prejudicial when they 
"approach[ ] one year." Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647,652 n.l (1992). 
In this case, the delay between defendant's charge and trial did not approach 
one year. But the delay between the arraignment and the trial exceeded 30 days, 
thus violating Utah Code Annotated § 774-6. Specifically, defendant was arraigned 
on April 7, 2005, and tried on June 6, 2005, a delay of 60 days. Under Hoyt and 
Trafny, this violation acted as a triggering mechanism, thereby requiring a full 
analysis under the four factors set forth in Barker. 
C. The delay in this case did not violate the test set forth in Barker v. 
Wingo. 
In Barker, the defendant claimed that the five-year delay between his arrest 
and trial violated his right to a speedy trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 516-19. The Supreme 
Court rejected that claim. Id. at 533-36. The Court noted that it is "impossible to 
determine with precision when the right [to a speedy trial] has been denied," and 
held that "any inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of 
11 
the right in the particular context of the case." Id. at 521-22. Recognizing that a 
"balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad 
hoc basis," Barker directed courts to examine the "[l]ength of delay, the reason for 
the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." 
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. These factors are not considered in isolation, however, and 
no one factor is controlling. In Barker, the Court "regard[ed] none of the four factors 
identified above as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a 
deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be 
considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant." Id. at 533. 
When applied to this case, these factors do not warrant reversal. 
1. The length of the delay in this case was acceptable under 
Barker. 
Under Barker, the court examines the time between the defendant's "formal 
indictment, information, or arrest," and the defendant's trial. State v. Hales, 2007 UT 
14,142,152 P.3d 321; see also United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302,310-11 (1986); 
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. Though the length of delay varies case-to-case, the delay in 
this case was well within the range of delays that have been approved in other 
speedy trial cases. 
12 
In Barker, for example, the Supreme Court held that a five-year delay between 
arrest and trial was justifiable under the facts of that case. Id. at 533-536. Utah's 
courts have also repeatedly permitted delays that approached or exceeded one year. 
See, e.g., State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628, 630 (Utah 1987) (affirming a delay of four 
years and six months); State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665,669-70 (Utah 1997) (affirming 
a delay of three years and one month); State v. Mejia, 2007 UT App 337, f ! 9-14,172 
P.3d 315 (affirming a 15-month delay); State v. Willett, 909 R2d 218,225 (Utah 1995) 
(affirming a 345-day delay); State v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319,1321 (Utah App. 1991) 
(affirming a 316-day delay); State v. Cornejo, 2006 UT App 215, I f 27-35,138 P.3d 97 
(affirming a 315-day delay). 
Defendant was arrested on these charges on January 26,2005, and his trial 
began on June 6,2005, a period of 131 days. This period was well within the range 
of delays that have been approved by Utah's courts. 
2. Defendant has not identified any improper reason for delay in 
this case. 
Under the second Barker factor, the court considers the reasons for the delay. 
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. When considering this factor, "different weights must be 
assigned to the varying justifications and reasons/' State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 
1328 (Utah 1986). In general, the reasons for delay are evaluated on a three-part 
13 
sliding scale: (1) "deliberate attempts] to delay the trial in order to hamper the 
defense" are "weighted heavily against the government"; (2) "more neutral 
reason[s] such as negligence or overcrowded courts" are "weighted less heavily but 
nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such 
circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant"; and 
(3) "valid reason[s], such as a missing witness. . . serve to justify the appropriate 
delay." Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. 
By refusing the penalize the government when the delay is caused by "valid 
reasons," id., the speedy trial right protects the government when it pursues its case 
"with reasonable diligence." Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 656 (1992). 
Moreover, insofaor as the Constitution only requires the State to act with "ordinary" 
or "customary promptness," the reasons for the delay are ultimately weighed in 
light of "the nature of the charges." Id. at 652,652 n.l; cf. Trafny, 799 P.2d at 708-09 
(directing courts to "look to the totality of the circumstances" when evaluating 
claims under Utah Code Annotated § 77-1-6); State v. Lozano, 462 P.2d 710,712 (Utah 
1969) ("Each case must be examined in light of its own particular facts."). Thus, a 
greater period of delay is acceptable when the defendant is prosecuted for 
"'serious'" or "'[more] complex' crimes." Cornejo, 2006 UT App 215, % 27 (quoting 
Barker, 407 U.S. at 531)). 
14 
In this case, defendant was charged with a first degree felony and a third 
degree felony. In order to prove its case, the State was required to prove that the 
chemicals and paraphernalia found inside the apartment were actually components 
of a meth lab. To do this, the State collected a large number of samples from the 
apartment and then submitted those samples to the Utah State Crime Lab for 
testing. See generally R. 229: 163-181. The resulting trial involved two days of 
testimony, the testimony of six prosecution witnesses, the cross-examination of 
defendant, and the submission of 53 different prosecution exhibits. See R. 229-30 
(index of witnesses and exhibits). Given this complexity, the State had a justifiable 
reason for taking five months to bring defendant to trial. 
In response, defendant claims that the State should at least be faulted for the 
delay that occurred when the court moved the trial from May 16, 2005, to June 6, 
2005. As a threshold matter, defendant is incorrect when he claims that "the record 
fails to contain anything about the circumstances" surrounding this continuance. 
Aplt. Br. 16-17. In his initial motion to dismiss, defense counsel explained that "the 
prosecution requested a continuance which was granted by the court to 
accommodate the prosecuting attorney who was assigned to the case/7 R. 82. The 
court's docket entry for May 13, 2005, provides additional detail: "Note: State 
prosecutor, James Cope, is in California for emergency, trial continued as per phone 
15 
conference with Nathan Jardine and Patricia Cassell in Judge Kennedy's chambers/' 
Addendum A, Finally, during arguments on defendant's motion to dismiss, the 
court explained from the bench that the prosecutor had "an emergency situation at 
the last minute with the illness of his mother in a different state, necessitating his 
travel." R. 229:12. 
Given this, the delay at issue here was not "oppressive or persecutorial in 
nature." State v. Archuletta, 577 P.2d 547, 548 (Utah 1978). Rather, this delay was 
simply the result of an unforeseen family emergency. Though defendant now 
claims that the State should have reassigned another prosecutor at the last minute, 
the trial court specifically concluded that this would have been impracticable tinder 
the circumstances. R. 229:12-13. In any event, even if the State should be charged 
for the three-week delay stemming from the prosecutor's family emergency, this 
delay would at most be one of "negligence," a decidedly "neutral reason" that is 
"weighted less heavily" in the ultimate analysis. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. 
In short, there is no evidence in this case that the prosecution intentionally 
delayed the prosecution. By trying this first degree felony jury trial within five 
months of filing charges, the prosecution acted with "reasonable diligence." 
Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656. The delays therefore should not be weighted against the 
State. 
16 
1. Defendant did not invoke his right to a speedy trial in a timely 
manner. 
Under the third Barker factor, the court considers when the defendant first 
asserted his speedy trial right. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. This Court has held that a 
failure "to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was 
denied a speedy trial/" Cornejo, 2006 UT App 215 at 132 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 
532). 
Defendant did not invoke his constitutional right to a speedy trial in any 
proceeding below. Defendant first invoked his rights under Utah Code Annotated 
§ 77-1-6 on April 19,2005, R. 228:2, a mere 48 days before the beginning of his two-
day trial. Though this exceeded the 30-days allowed by § 77-1-6, defendant agreed 
to a delay that was beyond 30-days from arraignment on two different occasions. 
Specifically, during the April 19 hearing, defendant agreed that the trial could begin 
on May 16, 2005, which was 39 days after the April 7 arraignment. R. 228: 2. 
Defendant reiterated this at the beginning of the June 6,2005, trial, stating that he 
would not "have had an objection" had the trial occurred on May 16,2005. R. 229: 
12. Given this, defendant has waived the right to claim that the State should have 
been strictly held to the statute's 30-day requirement. 
17 
Defendant therefore failed to ever raise his constitutional right, and he twice 
agreed to a trial setting that exceeded the statutory right at issue. This factor should 
not be weighed against the State. 
4. Defendant was not prejudiced by the delay in this case. 
Under the fourth Barker factor, the court considers whether the defendant has 
been prejudiced by the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. Such prejudice can be shown 
in a number of ways, including "oppressive pretrial incarceration, anxiety and 
concern of the accused, and the possibility that the accused's defense will be 
impaired by dimming memories and loss of exculpatory evidence." Doggett, 505 
U.S. at 654 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The impairment to a 
defendant's case through loss of memory or evidence is "the most serious" form of 
prejudice, insofar as "the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case 
skews the fairness of the entire system." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
Defendant identifies three different sources of alleged prejudice. Aplt. Br. 18-
21. Viewed in context, however, none should be weighed against the State. 
Defendant first claims that he was prejudiced because the parole board 
revoked his parole after he was arrested on these charges, but then refused to 
18 
schedule a revocation hearing until after these charges were adjudicated. Aplt. Br. 
18. 
Nothing in the record identifies the conditions of defendant's parole from his 
prior conviction, nor does the record show when or why his parole was revoked. 
More importantly, no evidence suggests that defendant was actually promised that 
he would actually receive a new revocation hearing after these charges were 
adjudicated. Without such evidence, this Court has no way to evaluate either the 
veracity or merits of defendant's claim. This claim should be rejected for this reason 
alone.8 
Even if the parole board had promised defendant a revocation hearing upon 
completion of this case, however, defendant still has not demonstrated prejudice. 
While defendant claims that "an immediate resolution" of this case may "have been 
relevant to his opportunity for a hearing with the parole board," Aplt. Br. 18, 
At the motion hearing below, defense counsel did argue that the "reason Mr. 
Walker is incarcerated at the Utah State Prison is because of the parole violation that 
is associated with these charges." R. 229:11. Defense counsel also made this claim 
in his motion to dismiss. R. 77. But defense counsel did not support this claim with 
any affidavits or documentation establishing that the parole board had made any 
specific promises. Moreover, defense counsel's statements are not evidence. State v. 
Devey, 2006 UT App 219, \ 16,138 P.3d 90. 
19 
defendant would only have been prejudiced if earlier resolution would have 
resulted in release or parole. 
At the trial below, however, defendant admitted that he smoked 
methamphetamine throughout the day, that he had told his companions how to 
properly make methamphetamine, that he had helped them dismantle the meth lab, 
and that he had lied to a detective during his initial interview. R. 230:37-42,52. All 
of this conduct would presumably have violated defendant's parole in the earlier 
case. 
Moreover, defendant was ultimately convicted in this case, and he has not 
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. Thus, regardless of whether 
defendant's parole was ultimately reviewed on May 18, 2005, or whether it was 
instead reviewed on June 8, 2005, the end result would have been the same. 
Specifically, defendant would have stood before the parole board freshly convicted 
of a first degree felony. Defendant has not shown that the parole board was likely 
to have released him under these circumstances. 
Defendant next claims that he was prejudiced because of the anxiety 
associated with this delay. Aplt. Br. 18-19. This argument is belied by the fact that 
on two different occasions, defendant stated that he would not have objected had 
the trial been held on May 16,2005, as originally planned. R. 228:2 (April 19,2005) 
20 
(Defense counsel: "I think we're entitled to 30 days, aren't we?" Court clerk: "We 
can go to May 16th and 17th." Defense counsel: "Very well."); R. 229:12 (June 6, 
2005) ("I think if we'd gone forward at the first setting of this matter, I don't think 
we would have had an objection."). Given this, defendant can only point to the 
additional anxiety associated with the move from May 16, 2005, to June 6, 2005. 
This Court should decline to overturn defendant's conviction on such a minimal 
basis. 
Finally, defendant claims that his trial defense was prejudiced by this delay. 
Aplt. Br. 19-21. Specifically, defendant suggests that though two detectives both 
testified that they saw defendant hiding bags under the hood of the car, "the delay 
and the passage of time affected or altered the detectives' perceptions of the events 
to the detriment of Walker's defense." Aplt. Br. 21. 
Defendant's claim is speculative. Defendant does not point to any fact that 
either detective had difficulty remembering at trial, nor does he point to any 
evidence from the record showing that either detective had any memory problems. 
Even if it were true that the delay in this case impacted the officers' memory, 
however, defendant still has not shown that the memory problems of the 
prosecution's witnesses prejudiced him. The Supreme Court has recognized that 
faded memories actually help a defendant, rather than hurt him. "As the time 
21 
between the commission of the crime and trial lengthens, witnesses may become 
unavailable or their memories may fade. If the witnesses support the prosecution, 
its case will be weakened, sometimes seriously so." Barker, 407 U.S. at 521; accord 
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307,330 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Just as 
delay may impair the ability of the accused to defend himself, so it may reduce the 
capacity of the government to prove its case/'). Thus, even if it were true that the 
five-month delay had clouded the detectives' "perceptions," Aplt. Br. 21, this would 
only have created an additional source of reasonable doubt, thereby benefiting 
defendant. 
In any evcnit, even if the five-month delay did alter these two detectives' 
memories, and even if the resultant impairment did harm defendant at trial, he still 
has not shown prejudice. Contrary to defendant's claim, he was not convicted just 
because two detectives saw him place a bag under the hood of a car. After spending 
several hours in a chemical-haze filled apartment with an operating meth lab, 
defendant told officers that he "knew what was going on in the apartment" and 
couldn't claim that he "didn't have any involvement" with the lab. Exhibit A at 37: 
20-22; 40: 30-40. Defendant later admitted that he had been smoking 
methamphetamine all day, that he told his two companions how to cook 
methamphetamine, that he helped clean the apartment, and that he helped 
22 
dismantle the lab. R. 230: 38-42. This imcontroverted evidence was sufficient to 
convict defendant even without the challenged testimony. 
* * * * * 
In sum: (1) the delay in this case was minimal; (2) the delay was justified by 
the State's legitimate need to properly prepare and try its case; (3) defendant never 
invoked his constitutional speedy trial rights, and he expressly agreed to a trial date 
that exceeded the 30-day rule set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 77-1-6; and (4) 
defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by the delay. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted December Y\. 2008. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
h 
R Y ^ / D . TENNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs, EDWARD ALLEN WALKER 
CASE NUMBER 051100261 State Felony 
Defendants KARMA LYNN GROESBECK, EDWARD ALLEN WALKER, CATHERINE 
M AUSTIN, are linked. 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 58-37D-4(l)(B) - POSSESSION OF CLANDESTINE LAB 
EQUIP/SUPP 1st Degree Felony 
Offense Date: November 17, 2004, 538 W MURRAY BLVD 
Disposition: June 13, 2005 Transferred 
Charge 2 - 58-37-8(2)(A)(I) - POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE 3rd Degree Felony 
Offense Date: November 17, 2004, 538 W MURRAY BLVD 
Disposition: June 13, 2005 Transferred 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
MARK KOURIS 
PARTIES 
Defendant - EDWARD ALLEN WALKER 
Represented by: NATHAN N JARDINE 
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: EDWARD ALLEN WALKER 
Offense tracking number: 16348351 
Date of Birth: May 04, 1963 
Jail Booking Number: 16348351 
Law Enforcement Agency: WEST VALLEY POLICE 
LEA Case Number: 041059168 
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Agency Case Number: 04021952 
Sheriff Office Number: 0155689 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
PROCEEDINGS 
01-27-05 Case filed 
Printed: 12/16/08 13:59:19 Page 1 
CASE NUMBER 051100261 State Felony 
01-27-05 Filed: From an Information 
01-27-05 Warrant ordered on: January 27, 2005 Warrant Num: 981141510 
Bail Allowed 
Bail amount: 50000.00 
01-27-05 Warrant issued on: January 27, 2005 Warrant Num: 981141510 Bail 
Allowed 
Bail amount: 50000.00 
Judge: PAT B BRIAN 
Issue reason: Based on the probable cause statement. 
02-09-05 Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY assigned. 
http://xchange.utcourts.gov/casesearch/CaseSearch?action=caseHist 12/16/2008 
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02-09-05 INITIAL APPEARANCE scheduled on February 15, 2005 at 01:00 PM 
with Judge KENNEDY. 
02-15-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for Initial Appearance 




Defendant pro se 
Audio 
Tape Number: 5016 Tape Count: 143 
INITIAL APPEARANCE 
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant. 
Advised of charges and penalties. 
The defendant is advised of right to counsel. 
The defendant waives right to counsel. 
Def intends to retain counsel 
ROLL CALL is scheduled. 
Date: 03/10/2005 
Time: 01:00 p.m. 
Location: FIRST FLOOR 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
3636 CONSTITUTION BLVD 
WEST VALLEY, UT 84119 
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
02-16-05 Warrant recalled on: February 16, 2005 Warrant num: 981141510 
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant 
appeared. 
02-16-05 ROLL CALL scheduled on March 10, 2005 at 01:00 PM with Judge 
KENNEDY. 
03-08-05 Filed: Notice of Appearance, Entry of Not Guilty Plea, Request 
for PreTrial Hearing and Demand for Jury Trial, Nathan N 
Jardme 
03-08-05 Filed: Request for Discovery 
03-11-05 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on March 17, 2005 at 01:00 PM 
with Judge CHRISTIANSEN. 
03-11-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE 
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CASE NUMBER 051100261 State Felony 
Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
PRESENT 
Clerk: deniseo 
Prosecutor: JOHNSON, SANDI 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JARDINE, NATHAN N 
Audio 
Tape Number: 05018 Tape Count: 1.51 
Set for Preliminary hearing on next available calendar. 
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 03/17/2005 
Time: 01:00 p.m. 
Location: FIRST FLOOR 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
3636 CONSTITUTION BLVD 
WEST VALLEY, UT 84119 
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
03-14-05 Note: PRELIMINARY HEARING calendar modified. Judge assignment 
Changed from KENNEDY, JOHN PAUL to CHRISTIANSEN, TERRY. 
Appearance on 3/17/2005. Reason: Clerk error. 
03-17-05 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on March 29, 2005 at 01:00 PM 
with Judge KENNEDY. 
03-17-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing 
Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
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PRESENT 
Clerk: deniseo 
Reporter: MIDGLEY, ED 
Prosecutor: COPE, JAMES M 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JARDINE, NATHAN N 
Audio 
Tape Number: 05021 Tape Count: 2.24 
HEARING | 
TAPE: 05021 COUNT: 2.24 
On record All parties present in court room #3. 
COUNT: 2.25 
State's witness #1 - Officer Kent Stokes - direct exam 
COUNT: 2.49 
State's exhibit #1 received into evidence 
COUNT: 2.49 
Cross exam of State's witness #1 
Reset Preliminary to allow State to provide tape to defense 
attorney. 
PRELIMINARY HEARING. 
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Date: 03/29/2005 
Time: 01:00 p.m. 
Location: FIRST FLOOR 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
3636 CONSTITUTION BLVD 
WEST VALLEY, UT 84119 
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
03-29-05 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on April 07, 2005 at 01:00 PM 
with Judge KENNEDY. 
03-29-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE 
Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
PRESENT 
Clerk: deniseo 
Reporter: MIDGLEY, ED 
Prosecutor: PLAYER, RILEY J 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JARDINE, NATHAN N 
Audio 
Tape Number: 05029 Tape Count: 2.12 
Defense attorney needs more time to review audio tape, reset for 
Preliminary hearing. 
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 04/07/2005 
Time: 01:00 p.m. 
Location: FIRST FLOOR 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
3636 CONSTITUTION BLVD 
WEST VALLEY, UT 84119 
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
04-07-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing 
Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
PRESENT 
Clerk: deniseo 
Reporter: WARNICK, SUZANNE 
Prosecutor: CORDOVA, KIM 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JARDINE, NATHAN N 
Audio 
Tape Number: 05030 Tape Count: 1.42 
http://xchange.utcourts.gov/casesearch/CaseSearch?action=caseHist 12/16/2008 
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TAPE: 05030 COUNT: 1.42 
On record all parties present in the courtroom to resume 
Preliminary hearing. 
COUNT: 1.45 
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State's witness #1 - Detective Ken Stokes - direct exam 
COUNT: 1.49 




State's exhibit #1 received into evidence 
COUNT: 1.54 
On advise of attorney, defendant does not testify. Defense rests 
and submits. 
COUNT: 1.55 
Court finds sufficient evidence to support probable cause on both 
counts. Court binds case over for trial. Set for BO/PTC. 
BO/PTC is scheduled. 
Date: 04/14/2005 
Time: 01:00 p.m. 
Location: SECOND FLOOR 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
3636 SOUTH 2700 WEST 
WEST VALLEY, UT 84119 
Before Judge: PAT B. BRIAN 
04-07-05 BO/PTC scheduled on April 14, 2005 at 01:00 PM in Third Floor 
with Judge BRIAN. 
04-12-05 BO/PTC rescheduled on April 13, 2005 at 01:00 PM Reason: 
Correct calendar. 
04-13-05 PTC - BO scheduled on April 21, 2005 at 01:00 PM with Judge 
KENNEDY. 
04-13-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for Pretrial Conference 
Judge: PAT B. BRIAN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: cindye 
Prosecutor: TORRIENTE, SEAN M 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JARDINE, NATHAN N 
Audio 
Tape Number: 5024 Tape Count: 242 
HEARING 
TAPE: 5024 COUNT: 242 
On record 
On record 
On def motion court orders hearing continued to next available 
calendar 
PTC - BO is scheduled. 
Date: 04/21/2005 
Time: 01:00 p.m. 
Location: FIRST FLOOR 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
3636 CONSTITUTION BLVD 
WEST VALLEY, UT 84119 
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
04-14-05 PTC - BO rescheduled on April 19, 2005 at 01:00 PM Reason: 
Conflict in attorney schedule. 
04-19-05 TWO-DAY TRIAL scheduled on May 16, 2005 at 08:30 AM with Judge 
KENNEDY. 
04-19-05 TWO-DAY TRIAL scheduled on May 17, 2005 at 08:30 AM with Judge 
KENNEDY. 
04-19-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE 
Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
PRESENT 
Clerk: deniseo 
Prosecutor: COPE, JAMES M 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JARDINE, NATHAN N 
Audio 
Tape Number: 05031 Tape Count: 1.34 
Set for two-day Jury on next available date. No final PTC needed. 
Parties to submit jury instructions and any motion prior to trial 
date. 
TWO-DAY TRIAL is scheduled. 
Date: 05/16/2005 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: FIRST FLOOR 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
3636 CONSTITUTION BLVD 
WEST VALLEY, UT 84119 
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
TWO-DAY TRIAL. 
Date: 05/17/2005 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: FIRST FLOOR 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
3636 CONSTITUTION BLVD 
WEST VALLEY, UT 84119 
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
05-13-05 Note: State prosecutor, James Cope, is in California for 
emergency, trial continued as per phone conference with Nathan 
Jardine and Patricia Cassell in Judge Kennedy's chambers. 
05-13-05 TWO-DAY TRIAL scheduled on June 06, 2005 at 08:30 AM with Judge 
KENNEDY. 
05-13-05 JURY TRIAL scheduled on June 07, 2005 at 08:30 AM with Judge 
KENNEDY. 
05-13-05 TWO-DAY TRIAL Cancelled. 
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05-13-05 TWO-DAY TRIAL Cancelled. 
06-02-05 Filed: Transcript of preliminary hearing dated 3-17-05, Ed 
Midgley, Court Reporter 
06-02-05 Filed: Transcript of preliminary hearing, volume II, dated 
4-7-05, Suzanne Warnick, Court Reporter 
06-06-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for Jury Trial 
Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
PRESENT 
Clerk: deniseo 
Prosecutor: COPE, JAMES M 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JARDINE, NATHAN N 
Audio 
Tape Number: 05052 Tape Count: 9.02 
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TAPE: 05052 COUNT: 9.02 
On record outside of jury, all parties present in the courtroom. 
Defense attorney, Nathan Jardine, motions court to dismiss case 
based on the Preliminary hearing being outside of the 10-day 
period. 
COUNT: 9.11 
State attorney, James Cope argues 
COUNT: 9.13 
Court finds the rules of the Preliminary hearing were correct and 
timely and denies Defense Motion to Dismiss case. 
COUNT: 9.17 
Court rules on Defense Motion in Limine 
COUNT: 9.39 
Jurors in courtroom, oath administered, Voir Dire by court and 
attorneys 
COUNT: 1056 
Jury impaneled and the oath administered to the impaneled Jury -
#1 Christian Van Leeuwen - #2 Rachael Hardy - #3 Brenda Willis - #4 
Joshua Bryner - #5 Toni Cornell - #6 Brett Tiedemann - #7 Stephen 
Koester - #8 Michael James Robertson. 
COUNT: 11.02 
Outside of Jury, Defense motions to stike the Jury impaneled based 




Court finds that the Jury panel was forthright, that the Jury 
meets the standard and are legally qualified to serve and therefore 
the Court denies the Defense motion to strike the impaneled Jury. 
COUNT: 11.20 
All parties, including the Jury present in the courtroom, Court 
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reads instructions to Jury. 
COUNT: 11.38 
Opening Statement - State 
COUNT: 11.58 
Opening Statment - Defense 
COUNT: 12.04 
Outside of Jury - Defense motions for continuance based on 




Court will allow defense time today to review State's photos, and 
denies Defense motion for Limine and for Mistrial. 
COUNT: 1.51 
All parties present in the courtroom including the Jury. State's 
witness #1 - Officer Aaron Cheshire - direct exam 
COUNT: 2.07 
Plaintiff exhibit #12, 13, 14 received into evidence 
COUNT: 2.08 
Plaintiff exhibit 6 - 1 1 received into evidence 
COUNT: 2.09 
Cross exam of Plaintiff Witness #1 
COUNT: 2.13 
Re-direct exam of Plaintiff Witness #1 
COUNT: 2.15 
Plaintiff Witness #2 - Detective Kent Stokes - direct exam 
COUNT: 2.34 
Plaintiff exhibit #1, 2, 3 received into evidence 
COUNT: 2.36 
Plaintiff exhibit #15, 16 received into evidence 
COUNT: 2.37 
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Plaintiff exhibit #17, 18, 19 received into evidence 
COUNT: 2.39 
Plaintiff exhibit 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 received into evidence 
COUNT: 3.03 
Cross exam of Plaintiff Witness #2 
COUNT: 3.26 
Defendant Exhibit A received into evidence 
COUNT: 3.52 
Plaintiff witness #3 - Mike Hepworth - direct exam 
COUNT: 4.14 
Cross exam of Plaintiff witness #3 
COUNT: 4.19 
Plaintiff Witness #4 - Detective Robert Idle - direct exam 
COUNT: 4.22 
Plaintiff exhibit #24 received into evidence 
COUNT: 4.23 
Plaintiff exhibit #25 received into evidence 
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COUNT: 4.24 
Plaintiff exhibit #51 received into evidence 
COUNT: 4.26 
Plaintiff exhibits #26 and #27 received into evidence 
COUNT: 4.27 
Plaintiff exhibit #28 received into evidence 
COUNT: 4.30 
Plaintiff exhibits #29, #30, #4, #5, #20, #21, #22, #23, #36, #37, 
#42, #44, #45, #46, #47, #48, #49, #50 received into evidence 
COUNT: 4.33 
Plaintiff exhibits #52 received into evidence 
COUNT: 4.35 
Plaintiff witness #5, Detective Steve Ward - direct exam 
COUNT: 4.40 
Plaintiff exhibits $38, #39, #40, #41 received into evidence 
COUNT: 4.41 
Cross exam of Plaintiff witness #5 
COUNT: 4.43 
Plaintiff Witness #6 - Detective Matt Carmen - direct exam 
COUNT: 4.48 
Cross exam of Plaintiff witness #6 
Court reporter, Michelle Batty, present for all court proceedings. 
6-06-05 Note: JURY TRIAL minutes modified. 
6-07-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for Jury Trial 
Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
PRESENT 
Clerk: deniseo 
Prosecutor: COPE, JAMES M 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JARDINE, NATHAN N 
Audio 
Tape Number: 05052 Tape Count: 8.38 
TRIAL 
TAPE: 05052 COUNT: 8.38 
On record 2nd day of trial.outside of Jury, court and attorneys 
discuss jury instruction issues. 
COUNT: 8.45 
Cross exam of Plaintiff witness #2 
COUNT: 9.33 
Re-direct exam of Plaintiff witness #2 
COUNT: 9.41 
Plaintiff exhibit #53 received into evidence 
COUNT: 9.43 
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COUNT: 10.39 
Defense witness #1 - Edward Allen Walker - direct exam 
COUNT: 11.01 
Cross exam of Defense witness #1 
COUNT: 11.25 




Court resumes, all parties, including Jury present in the 
courtroom, court reads jury instructions 
COUNT: 1.45 
Closing Argument - State 
COUNT: 2.08 




Clerk administered oath to Baliff - Baliff takes Jury out to 
deliberate 
COUNT: 4.21 
Outside of Jury, court puts question jury asked on the record. 
COUNT: 4.25 
All parties, including the Jury present in the courtroom. Clerk 
reads verdict. 
Defendant, Edward Allen Walker is found guilty by the Jury as 
charged in the information 
COUNT: 4.29 
Jury is polled by the clerk. Jury dismissed. 
COUNT: 4.31 
Outside of Jury, Defense attorney makes a motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict, defense has 10 days to prepare Motion, 
State has 10 days to respond. . 
Both parties to submit Motions to Judge Kennedy at the Matheson 
building, he will hear and rule on Defense Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict there before sentencing. 
Judge Adkins will sentence the defendant at the West Jordan 
building. APP to interview defendant at Utah State Prison and will 
prepare a Presentence report. 
Court reporter, Michelle Batty present for all proceedings. 
06-08-05 Filed: Jury Instructions and Verdict 
06-08-05 Note: JURY TRIAL minutes modified. 
06-08-05 SNT/APP scheduled on July 21, 2005 at 01:00 PM in WJ Courtroom 
36 with Judge ADKINS. 
06-13-05 Judge ROBERT ADKINS assigned. 
06-13-05 Note: Case Transferred to Salt Lake City District Case # 
051903660 
07-15-05 Note: As per Kimberly, clerk to Judge Kennedy, case was 
transferred and will be sentencing with Judge Kennedy at the 
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Matheson building. 
07-15-05 SNT/APP Cancelled. 
Reason: Court Ordered 
07-22-05 Filed: Pre-Sentence Report from APP 
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01-05-06 Filed: Transcript of Jury Trial, Volume I, dated 6-6-05, 
Michelle Beatty, Court Reporter 
01-05-06 Filed: Transcript of Jury Trial, Volume II, dated 6-7-05, 
Michelle Beatty, Court Reporter 
06-02-07 Judge MICHELE CHRISTIANSEN assigned. 
04-30-08 Judge MARK KOURIS assigned. 
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